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Abstract
The axiomatic characterization of price or market equilibrium is one of the most important problems
in the general equilibrium theory. There does not seem to exist, however, so many papers on the
axiomatic characterization problem of monetary equilibrium. The overlapping-generations model with
a double innity of commodities and agents is one of the most fundamental frameworks for introducing
money into an economic model, although a simple game-theoretic or welfare characterization on the
role of money under competitive mechanism is widely known to be dicult. In this paper, we show
that the informational eciency axiomatic characterization as in Hurwicz (1960), Mount and Reiter
(1974) and Sonnenschein (1974) is possible for the price-money competitive mechanism for overlapping-
generations economies among the class of all allocation mechanisms with messages. In particular,
the category theoretic universal mapping characterization in Sonnenschein (1974) is generalized and
applied to the overlapping-generations framework through our monetary version of Debreu-Scarf's
core limit theorem of Urai and Murakami (2015). Our argument is also closely related to the replica
characterization approaches of Walrasian social choice mechanism like Thomson (1988) and Nagahisa
(1994), and provides a comprehensive perspective on them.
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Property
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1 Introduction
The axiomatic characterization of price or market equilibrium is one of the most important problems in
the general equilibrium theory. There does not seem to exist, however, so many papers on the axiomatic
characterization problem of monetary equilibrium (an equilibrium with at money or the non-negative
wealth transfer).
In order to describe money in the static economic model, it is widely known that an ordinary nite
economic setting is insucient and the double innity of agent-commodity structure, e.g., the overlapping-
generations framework, is necessary. The overlapping-generations model was rstly proposed by Samuelson
in 1958 (Samuelson 1958), and has generated much discussion and many papers. An outstanding character-
istic of this model is that competitive equilibria may not necessarily be Pareto-optimal and that the outside
money has the potential to improve on the welfare of the economy. Although Samuelson's argument was
not entirely accurate, it is known that the characterization of money in an overlapping-generations econ-
omy is not so straightforward from the welfare and game theoretic viewpoint (see Hayashi 1976, Okuno
and Zilcha 1980 and Esteban 1986) except for the elementary welfare relation between the monetary
equilibrium and the weakly Pareto-optimal allocation (Balasko and Shell 1980 and Esteban 1986).
In this paper, to obtain an alternative explanation for the importance of money, we provide the axiomatic
characterization of the price-money competitive mechanism in overlapping-generations economies among
the class of allocation mechanisms with messages together with several axioms and category theoretic
treatments in Sonnenschein (1974). In his seminal paper (1974 Propositions 1, 2 and 7), Sonnenschein
characterizes the price mechanism as the unique resource allocation mechanism that can be referenced
(i) uniquely under many-to-one congurations by (ii) many allocation mechanisms satisfying the several
important axioms, where (i) means a certain kind of eciency and (ii) means a universality for the
price message mechanism. His result uses Debreu-Scarf's replica core equivalence theorem and a similar
characterization under the social choice framework is given as a replica stability condition in characterizing
Walrasian mechanism like Thomson (1988) and Nagahisa (1994). Also, his result can be related to the
informational eciency problem like Hurwicz (1960), Mount and Reiter (1974), Osana (1978) and Jordan
(1982).1
In the double innity economies including overlapping-generations ones, the non-negative wealth transfer
or outside money plays an essential role for equilibrium states, so it is important to characterize the
competitive market mechanism as the allocation mechanism with a message space not only of prices
but also of wealth transfers, the price-money message mechanism. We use in this paper the method of
Sonnenschein (1974) since his categorical treatment is appropriate for our innite dimensional and partially
economy-dependent (monetary) message space settings. It should also be noted that in the approach of
Sonnenschein, the Cobb-Douglas dependent argument is not necessary. Recently the authors have shown a
core limit theorem for monetary overlapping-generations economies (Urai and Murakami 2015). Our limit
theorem together with Sonnenschein's axioms and category theoretic framework is sucient to characterize
the eciency and universality properties of the price-money message mechanism.
2 Economies
LetN be the set of all positive integers and R be the set of real numbers. A pure exchange overlapping-
generations economy, or more simply, an economy, E, is comprised of the following list:
1 See Sonnenschein (1974, Propositions 3{6).
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(E.1) fItg1t=1: a countable family of mutually disjoint nite subsets of N such that
S1
t=1 It  N ,
I1 6= ; and for each t 2N , if It = ;, then It+1 = ;. It is the index set of agents in generation t.
(E.2) fKtg1t=1: a countable family of non-empty nite intervals, Kt = fk(t); k(t)+1;    ; k(t)+`(t)g
such that k(t) 2 N , `(t) 2 N , S1t=1Kt = N , k(t) < k(t + 1)5 k(t) + `(t) for all t 2 N . Kt is the
index set of commodities available to generation t.
(E.3) f(%i; !i)gi2St2N It : countably many agents, where %i is a continuous, strictly monotonic,
strictly convex and rational weak preference relation on the commodity space for each generation,
RKt+ , for each i 2 It. The initial endowment of i, !i, is an element of RKt++ = fx j x : Kt ! R++g
for each i 2 It.
It is convenient to identify the commodity space for each generation RKt+ with a subset of R
N, which is
the set of all functions from N to R, by considering x 2 RKt+ a function that takes value 0 on N nKt.
Then we can dene the total commodity space for economy 1t=1RKt+ as the set of all nite sums among
the points in the commodity spaces of the generations. Clearly, 1t=1RKt+ can be identied with a subset
of direct sum R1, the set of all nite real sequences, which is a subspace of the set of all real sequences,
R1  RN with pointwise convergence topology.
Given an economy, E = (fItg1t=1; fKtg1t=1; f(%i; !i)gi2St2N It), the price space for E, P(E), is dened
as the set of all p in RN+ such that under the duality between R1 (with relative topology) and R
1 (with
pointwise convergence topology), p positively evaluates all the agents' initial endowments:
P(E) = fp 2 RN+ j p  !i > 0 for all i 2 It, for all t 2Ng:(1)
Since for all i 2 It, !i belongs to RKt++ for all t 2 N , the price space of E always includes RN++ for all E
in Econ, where Econ denotes the set of all economies satisfying conditions (E.1), (E.2) and (E.3).
For each E = (fItg; fKtg; f(%i; !i)g) 2 Econ, sequence (xi 2 RKt+ )i2St2N It is called an allocation for
E. Allocation (xi 2 RKt+ )i2St2N It is said to be feasible ifX
t2N
X
i2It
xi =
X
t2N
X
i2It
!i;(2)
where the summability in RN of both sides of the inequality is assured by (E.2). The list of price
vector p 2 P(E), non-negative wealth transfer function ME :
S1
t=1 It ! R+, and feasible allocation
(xi 2 RKt+ )i2St2N It , is called a monetary Walras allocation for E, if for each t 2 N and i 2 It, xi is a
%i-greatest element in set fxi 2 RKt+ j p  xi5 p  !i +ME (i)g. Since the non-negative wealth transfer is
an abstraction of the money supply in perfect-foresight overlapping-generations economies, we denote the
set of all monetary Walras allocations byMWalras(E).
A coalition in economy E = (fItg; fKtg; f(%i; !i)g) 2 Econ is a set of consumers S 
S1
t=1 It.
Allocation x for economy E is said to be blocked by coalition S if it is possible to nd commodity bundles
yi for all i 2 S such that Pi2S(yi   !i) = 0 and yi%i xi for all i 2 S, and yi i xi for at least one i 2 S.
For each E = (fItg; fKtg; f(%i; !i)g) 2 Econ, the set of all feasible allocations that cannot be blocked
by any coalition is said to be the core of economy E and is denoted by Core(E). Element x 2 Core(E) is
called a core allocation. The set of all feasible allocations that cannot be blocked by any nite coalition is
called the nite core of economy E and is denoted by Fcore(E). Element x 2 Fcore(E) is called a nite
core allocation for E.
2
3 Replica Core Equivalence Theorem
The replica core equivalence theorem for overlapping-generations economy was proved in Aliprantis and
Burkinshaw (1990). Their result, however, does not include the case with monetary (non-negative wealth
transfer) equilibrium. Our previous paper (Urai and Murakami 2015) treats this problem through the
following replica nite core concept.
Given economy E = (fItg; fKtg; f(%i; !i)g) 2 Econ and its feasible allocation x = (xi 2 RKt+ )i2St2N It
we denote by E(x) the economy whose initial endowment allocation, ! = (!i), is replaced by x = (xi).2
Hence, we have E = E(!). Let us consider the replica economy
Em(x) En(!);(3)
consisting of all members of the m-fold replica economy of E(x) and all members of the n-fold replica
economy of E(!) for each m and n in N . Note that when the number of agents of E is nite, Core(Em+n)
is equal to Fcore(Em+n) and for each feasible allocation x of E, if its (m+n)-fold replica allocation belongs
to Core(Em+n), then the replica allocation also belongs to Fcore(Em(x) En(!)).3 Moreover, as we see
below, every (m + n)-fold replica allocation of x belongs to Fcore(Em(x)  En(!)) if and only if x is a
monetary Walras allocation. Therefore the standard replica core limit theorem (Debreu and Scarf 1963)
can be restated as follows (because there is no dierence between our monetary Walras allocation and the
Walras allocation for nite economies).
A feasible allocation x for E is a Walras allocation if and only if its (m+n)-fold replica allocation
belongs to Fcore(Em(x) En(!)) for all m 2N and n 2N suciently large.
In general, the number of agents in E is not nite, and Fcore(Em(x)  En(!)) gives us a complete
characterization of monetary Walras allocations. That is, an element ofMWalras(E) has a certain kind
of stability-under-replication property with respect to the form Em(x) and En(!) for the nite core solution
concept. The next theorem is proved in Urai and Murakami (2015) showing the above replica nite core
stability condition for the element ofMWalras(E). Thus a replica stability condition like Thomson (1988)
and Nagahisa (1994) is satised automatically in our price-money message mechanism.
Theorem 1 (Replica Core Equivalence Theorem) : A feasible allocation x for E is a monetary Walras
allocation if and only if its (m + n)-fold replica allocation belongs to Fcore(Em(x)  En(!)) for every
m 2N and n 2N .
Let Cmn(E) be the set of allocations x for E such that the (m+n)-fold replica allocation of x belongs to
Fcore(Em(x)En(!)). Then Cmn(E)  Cm0n0(E)     where m0=m and n0=n, andMWalras(E) =T1
n=1
T1
m=1C
mn(E). Thus we have obtained an extension of Debreu-Scarf replica core limit theorem to
monetary Walras allocations in economies including overlapping-generations settings.
2 In the following, the subscript, i 2 St2N It, for an allocation is sometimes omitted as long as there is no risk of confusion.
3 Assume that an (m+ n)-fold replica allocation xm+n for Em(x)En(!) does not belong to Fcore(Em(x)En(!)). If
the number of agents of E is nite, then allocation x is feasible for the nite set of all agents of E. It is possible, therefore, to
extend every nite coalition blocking xm+n in Fcore(Em(x)  En(!)) to a nite coalition including all members of m-fold
replica economy of E, i.e., to a nite coalition blocking xm+n in Em+n(!).
3
4 An Axiomatic Characterization of the Price-Money Message
Mechanism
The replica nite core limit theorem in the above section, Theorem 1, enables us to provide an axiomatic
characterization of the price-money message mechanism through the universal mapping problem as in
Sonnenschein (1974). Our Theorem 2 on the price-money dictionary is corresponding to Sonnenschein's
Proposition 1 and Theorem 3 on the isomorphism property is to his Proposition 7.
A social choice correspondence g : Econ ! (R1)N is said to be compatible with a nite-core and
weakly Pareto-optimal allocation if and only if g(E)  Fcore(E) and g(E)  fxjx 2 Fcore(E(x))g for all
E 2 Econ. An abstract message mechanism (an allocation mechanism with messages under the framework
of Sonnenschein 1974) based on social choice correspondence g is a triple (A;; f), where A is a set that
is called a message domain,  is a correspondence that indicates for each economy E the set (E)  A of
equilibrium messages for E, and f is a function that denes for each agent, i, and each message, a, the
response, f i(E; a), of the agent in E to the message, satisfying that g(E) = f(f i(E; a))1i=1 j a 2 (E)g.
The monetaryWalrasian social choice correspondence associates with each economy the monetaryWalras
allocations of the economy. In this section, we treat allocations that are compatible with nite-core and
weakly Pareto-optimal only. For the standard message mechanism, let A be the product of RN+ and
fM jM : Econ! RN+ g, (E) be the set of equilibrium prices with the non-negative wealth transfers of E,
and f be the excess demand function of each consumer relative to price-money messages (more precisely,
see below). We use the following idempotency axiom.
Axiom I (Idempotency): For each economy E 2 Econ and message a 2 A, f(E(f(E; a)); a) = f(E; a).
In the above, we use the notation E(x) in section 3. Moreover, let us consider the following axiom of
Sonnenschein (1974).
Axiom S (Sonnenschein): For each nite list of agents and economies, (i1;E
1); (i2;E
2); : : : ; (im;E
m),
each message a 2 A and each list of responses (f is(Es; a))ms=1, there exists an economy E including
fi1; i2; : : : ; img such that a is an equilibrium message for E for which the equilibrium list (f i(E; a))1i=1
is an extension of (f is(Es; a))ms=1.
It follows that we do not treat messages that cannot constitute an equilibrium state for any suciently
large extension of a certain list of agents and economies. The above axiom together with the replica
equivalence theorem (Theorem 1) is closely related to the replication stability axiom of Thomson (1988).
We assume in the following that the commodity structure fKtg1t=1 is xed. The set of all economies
with the commodity structure fKtg1t=1 is denoted by Econ. Denote by I(t) the set of all agents in
generations from 1 to t, i.e., I(t) =
St
s=1 Is, and by K(t) the set of all commodities that are available
for agents in I(t), i.e., K(t) =
St
s=1Ks. For each t, denote by 
K(t) the unit simplex in RK(t) and by

K(t)
++ its relative interior, R
K(t)
++ \ K(t). Let us consider the projective system (K(t
0)
++ ; %t0t)t0;t2N and
projective limit ++ = lim  (
K(t0)
++ ; %t0t), where %t0t : 
K(t)
++ ! K(t
0)
++ is dened as %t0t(p) =
prK(t0) p
k prK(t0) pk .
4
We note that ++ can be recognized as a subset of R
1
++ by identifying the equivalence class [(xt)
1
t=1]
of (xt)
1
t=1 2
Q1
t=1
K(t)
++ with the element p 2 R1++ such that prK(1) p = x1 and
prK(t) p
k prK(t) pk = xt for
4 The projective limit is non-empty since t 2 N is countable and every %t0t is surjective (see Bourbaki 1939, p.198,
Proposition 5).
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all t = 2; 3;   .5 We can take the price and non-negative wealth transfer domain as P M = fp 2
R1j 9[(xt)1t=1] 2 ++; prK(1) p = x1;
prK(t) p
k prK(t) pk = xt; for each t = 1; 2;   g  fM jM : Econ
 3 E 7!
ME 2 RN+ g. The excess demand function ei for the i-th consumer (%i; !i) in E 2 Econ is dened as
ei : PRN+ 3 (p;ME) 7! ei(p;ME) 2 R1, where ei(p;ME) is identied with the points of the consumption
set RKt+ , such that e
i(p;ME) is the %i-greatest point in fxi 2 RKt j p  xi5 p  !i +ME(i)g for each i 2 It
and each t 2N .
Dene e : Econ (PM)! (R1)N by e(E; p;M) = (ei(p;ME))i2St2N It .6 If (E) denotes the set of
all monetary Walrasian equilibrium messages (the set of market equilibrium price and non-negative wealth
transfer messages) for each E 2 Econ, then (PM; ; e) is a message mechanism based on social choice
correspondenceMWalras(E). This is called the price-money message mechanism.
Theorem 2 (Price-Money Dictionary Theorem) : If (A;; f) is a message mechanism based on social
choice correspondence g that is compatible with the nite-core and weakly Pareto-optimal allocations,
and if (A;; f) satises Axioms I and S, then (i) there exists a unique function  : A! PM such that
the following triangle commutes, and (ii) on (A)  PM, the price-money message mechanism satises
axioms I and S.
(R1)N 
6
1Econ  
Econ  (PM)
Econ A
e
f
@
@
@I
Proof : (i) Assume that (A;; f) is a message mechanism based on social choice correspondence g sat-
isfying Axioms I and S, and let a be an element of A. Dene for each t 2 N , h(t)(x;%i) for each
consumption x 2 RKs for agent i 2 Is  I(t) of an economy E 2 Econ as h(t)(x;%i) = fp 2 K(t)j y i
x implies py= pxg, where everyRKs is canonically identied with a subspace ofK(t). We rst show thatT
h(t)(f i(E; a);%i) is non-empty for each t 2N , where the intersection is over all consumers and economies
in Econ, and f i(E; a) is a response of i 2 I(t) in E to message a in (A;; f). Because K(t) is compact,
and because each of the sets in the collection of which we are forming the intersection is closed, it is suf-
cient to show that
Tm
s=1 h
(t)(f is(Es; a);%is) is non-empty for any [(i1;E1); (i2;E2); : : : ; (im;Em)]. Given
the list [(i1;E1); (i2;E2); : : : ; (im;Em)] of agents in I(t) and economies, by Axiom S there exists E 2 Econ
containing fi1; i2; : : : ; img and a 2 (E), such that the equilibrium list, (f i(E; a))1i=1, is an extension of
(f is(Es; a))ms=1. Because (f
i(E; a))1i=1 is weakly Pareto-optimal, by Balasko and Shell (1980) and Este-
ban (1986), it is supported by a price as a price-wealth equilibrium, and thus
Tm
s=1 h
(t)(f is(Es; a);%is) is
non-empty. Moreover, because for some economy and its agents,
T1
i=1 h
(t)(f i(E; a);%i) is singleton and is
an element of 
K(t)
++ , it follows that
T
h(t)(f i(E; a);%i) is composed of a single point p(t).
By denition of h(t), for all t05 t, p(t0) = %t0t(p(t)), and we obtain a unique element p 2 P by identifying
it with the unique element of the projective limit lim  
Tm
s=1 h
(t)(f is(Es; a);%is)  ++. Let us denote that
5 For example, if K(1) = f1; 2g, K(2) = f1; 2; 3g, K(3) = f1; 2; 3; 4g,   , then the element ((1=2; 1=2), (1=3; 1=3; 1=3),
(1=4; 1=4; 1=4; 1=4);   ) of ++ can be identied with (1=2; 1=2; 1=2; 1=2; 1=2;   ) of R1++.
6 For the argument in the following, we use the property that for each price-money message (p;M) there is an economy in
Econ such that (p;M) is the unique price-money equilibrium message supporting the equilibrium allocation. For this, the
condition that Econ includes the class of economies consisting of agents with Cobb-Douglas utility functions, is sucient
but not necessary.
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point, p, by 1(a), and dene 2(a) =M , M : Econ 3 E 7!ME 2 RN+ , where ME(i) = 1(a)  (f i(E; a) 
!i), which we prove as follows that it is non-negative under Axioms S, I and Theorem 1. Let (a) be
(1(a); 2(a)) 2 PfM jM : Econ 3 E 7!ME 2 RN+ g = PM. To establish the theorem, it is sucient
to show that for each economy E 2 Econ and each a 2 A, allocation y = (yi)1i=1 = (f i(E; a))1i=1 is
such that, for each i, yi = f
i(E; a) can be extended (through Axiom S) to a monetary Walras allocation
under the message a for a large economy including i. To see this, by using Axiom S, let E be an
economy including i such that a is an equilibrium message for E and response yi = f
i(E; a) is equal
to yi = f
i(E; a). We show that the list of responses, y = f(E; a), is a monetary Walras allocation.
Assume that it is not. Then, by Theorem 1, there are m and n such that (m+ n)-fold replica allocation
of y = (y
j
)1j=1 is not an element of Fcore(Em(y)  En(!)). Then there are (k1 + k2) members
of Em(y)  En(!) blocking y, where k1 members belong to Em(y) and k2 members belong to
En(!). Under Axiom I, by applying Axiom S again, we obtain an economy E including the (k1 + k2)
members of Em(y)  En(!) such that a is a solution message for E satisfying that the equilibrium
list, (f i(E; a))1i=1, a nite core allocation, is an extension of those of the k1 members of E
m
(y) (that
are by Axiom I, f i(E; a) = f i(E(y); a) = f i(E; a), equal to their original responses) and the k2
members of En(!) under a 2 A. However, this is impossible, because the (k1+ k2) members can improve
upon it.
(ii) For the latter assertion, one can observe in the above argument, y = f(E; a) = e(E; (a)) is a
monetary Walras allocation, which proves that axiom S is satised on (A). Moreover, it is straightforward
that the commutativity of the diagram with axiom I for (A;; f) means that axiom I is satised on (A)
since e(E(e(E; (a))); (a)) = e(E(f(E; a)); (a)) = f(E(f(E; a)); a) = f(E; a) = e(E; (a)). 
The above theorem shows that the price-money message mechanism represents all the message mech-
anisms based on social choice correspondences compatible with nite-core and weakly Pareto-optimal
allocations under axioms I and S. The theorem, therefore, can be interpreted as a price-money message
mechanism representation theorem. We call  the price-money dictionary.
A non-negative price-wealth transfer message, (p;M), has a huge scope. In particular, the domain of
M is Econ, and it must specify all non-negative wealth transfers for all economies. Such a message may
become too complicated to be called \simple" in the sense of Sonnenschein (1974) and one can easily
verify that the price-money message mechanism may not satisfy axioms I and S.7 However, if we restrict
the domain of non-negative price-wealth transfer messages to the class satisfying Axioms I and S, PM =
f(p;M) 2 P Mj (p;M) is an image of  for some (A, , f) in Theorem 2 satisfying axioms I and S.g,
we have the following isomorphism theorem. For this assertion, we use the next axiom on the dependency
of monetary messages on economic structures.
Axiom D (Dependency on the Economic Structure) : If E = (fItg1t=1; fKtg1t=1; f(%i; !i)i2St2N Itg) and
E0 = (fI 0tg1t=1; fK 0tg1t=1; f(%0i; !0i)i2St2N Itg) are such that fItg1t=1 = fI 0tg1t=1, fKtg1t=1 = fK 0tg1t=1 and
!i = !
0
i for all i 2
S
t2N It, then ME =ME0 for all M 2M.
7 Axiom I will be satised if we restrict our attention to monetary mesages that intend to realize a certain desirable level
of income for each person independently from their initial endowments for each economy E, but in general, it will not be
satised. To obtain a counter example for axiom S, assume that fKtg1t=1 is the two period one commodity overlapping-
generation structure. ConsiderM such that amount p !i+ME(i) > 0 for each E, i 2 I(1), is greater than the amounts of the
total value of their initial endowments under (1; 1; 1;   ) 2 R1+ that is greater than all equilibrium prices for commodities in
K(1). (Note that a price (p1; p

2; p

3;   ) is assumed to satisfy p1 + p2 = 1. See denition of P.) Thus, we cannot expect the
above message to be an equilibrium of any E2 Econ. In Sonnenschein (1974), the mnemonic S is used because the condition
states that \any nite number of individuals can be swamped" and it \restricts the messages of a message mechanism to be
simple."
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Theorem 3 (Isomorphism Theorem) : Consider the restriction of price-monetary message mechanism
(PM; ; e). Let (P 0; 0; e0) be a message mechanism based on social choice correspondence g on Econ
compatible with the nite core and weakly Pareto-optimal allocations. If (P 0; 0; e0) satises axioms I and
S, and if, for every message mechanism (A;; f) satisfying axioms I and S, there exists a unique mapping
0 : A! P 0 such that f(E; a) = e0  [1Econ 0](E; a), then (i) there exists an isomorphism (bijection) h0
such that h0 : PM ! P 0 and e = e0  [1Econ h0]. (ii) Moreover, assume that monetary messages satisfy
Axiom D. If we can restrict the problem on spaces with topological (resp. on each component space of
an inverse system with dierentiable) structures and continuous mappings (resp. dierentiable coordinate
mappings ), then the isomorphism can be taken as the homeomorphism (resp. dieomorphism for each
component space).8
Proof : Because (PM; ; e) is now assumed to be a message mechanism based on social choice corre-
spondence g satisfying axioms I and S, we have the next diagram by assumption.
(R1)N 
6
1Econ  0
Econ  P 0
Econ PM
e0
e
@
@
@I
Moreover, because (P 0; 0; e0) is also a message mechanism based on social choice correspondence g, the
previous theorem shows that we have the next diagram.
(R1)N 
6
1Econ  
Econ PM
Econ  P 0
e
e0
@
@
@I
Since the identity mapping is the unique mapping for P 0 to P 0 satisfying e0 = e0  id and PM to PM
satisfying e = e  id, we have 0   = id and   0 = id, which means that  and 0 are bijectives. Let us
dene h0 as h0 = 0, then we have the rst assertion.
For the second assertion, for each (p;M) 2 PM, each economy E 2 Econ and each generation t,
consider two agents is and js, s 2 f1; : : : ; tg such that e = (   ; ei1 ;    ; ej1 ;    ; ei2 ;    ; ej2 ;   ) on PM
is one to one, continuous and/or dierentiable.9 
8 In this paper, the price-money message space can be identied with an inverse limit of the nite dimensional domains
of each coordinate function ei for e and the dierentiable structure can be discussed under such nite dimensional domains.
For example, we can take the domain of ei for i 2 I(t) as K(t)++ RI(t)+ and identify it with a subset of PM under the
canonical identication R1  R1. Then, we can also obtain under h0, the image of K(t)++ RI(t)+ in P 0, the domain of all
e0i, i 2 I(t), and the dieomorphism between them.
9 If generation s 2 f1; : : : ; tg of E consists of a single member, alternatively consider an economy E^ including all members
of generations 1;    ; t of economy E such that every generation s of E^ consists of at least two members and (p;M) is an
equilibrium message of it by Axiom S. To obtain a concrete example for such a one-to-one, continuous and/or dierentiable
mapping, take a pair of Cobb-Douglas and Leontief utility agents for each generation. Note that the Leontief type utility is
not dierentiable, but the demand function induced from it can be dierentiable.
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By Theorem 3, we see that an allocation mechanism with messages that can play the role of the dictionary
property described in Theorem 2 is essentially unique. The result can also be restated through the
universal mapping theorem (Bourbaki 1939, p.284) that assures the existence of such an object unique up
to isomorphism as a solution to the universal mapping problem.
5 Conclusion
1. We have seen that for every private representation (A;; f) of a social choice correspondence g
compatible with the nite core and weakly Pareto-optimal allocations satisfying Axioms I and S, there
exists a dictionary function,  : A ! P M uniquely (Theorem 2). In other words, the result of such
a private representation (an allocation mechanism with message) can be universally realized through the
price-money message mechanism (PM; ; e) uniquely (the universality and the eciency property).
2. If we restrict the domain of an abstract message mechanism to those satisfying axioms I and S, the
price-money message mechanism has the unique (up to isomorphism) minimum size of the information
space satisfying the dictionary property (Theorem 3).
3. Based on the dierentiable structure, to develop the alternative informational eciency argument to
our framework is also desirable. By considering the dierentiable structure on the message and commodity
spaces, we will be able to obtain the same results as Propositions 3{6 in Sonnenschein (1974) that will
provide an informational eciency theorem like Hurwicz (1960), Mount and Reiter (1974) and Osana
(1978), as well as a uniqueness theorem of the competitive message mechanism like Jordan (1982). These
will be, however, the subjects of further investigations.
4. It should also be noted that our monetary equilibrium concept (a competitive equilibrium with non-
negative wealth transfer) is related to the concept of \dividend equilibrium" or \equilibrium with slack"
(see, e.g., Aumann and Dreze 1986) and the role of our replica nite core concept can also be identied
with that of \rejective core" in Konovalov (2005) on the limit core characterization for such equilibria.
Therefore, if we generalize the preference satiation structure for the double innity economy (see our Urai
and Murakami 2015, footnote 15), our results are possible to be identied with an another replica core
characterization for such dividend equilibria.
5. Thomson (1988) and Nagahisa (1994) use the replication stability axiom like Axiom S of Sonnenschein
(1974) to characterize Walrasian correspondences in a direct way for the standard social choice setting.
It will be interesting to apply their arguments for our double innity monetary economic situation, since
various social choice axioms and frameworks would be desirable for describing the institution like money.
6. The method of Sonnenschein is appropriate for our setting of (i) the innite dimensional commodity
and generation structure and (ii) the partially economy-dependent property of messages. Moreover, his
strongly structured response function setting has an advantage over the message-process argument in
Hurwicz (1960), Mount and Reiter (1974), Osana (1978) and Jordan (1982) since it does not necessarily
depend on (iii) the Cobb-Douglas utility assumption of the agents.
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